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CASE NOTE
ECONOMIC LAW—Vertical Minimum Pricing in Leegin—Adrift With the
Rule of Reason; Sinking With Stare Decisis; Leegin Creative Leather Prod.,
Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.,127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007).
Ryan T. Jardine*

INTRODUCTION
Antitrust law in the United States sprouted from the Sherman Act of 1890.1
Congress passed the Sherman Act out of a growing concern over increasing
prices caused by concentrated businesses, monopoly power, and cartels.2 Typical
American values such as entrepreneurial independence, freedom to contract, and
free competition created the idealistic support for the Act’s passage.3
The spring of 1911 provided the opportunity for the U.S. Supreme Court
to decide four cases addressing the scope of the Sherman Act.4 One of these
decisions, Dr. Miles Medical Company v. John D. Park & Sons Co., changed the
analytical landscape of antitrust litigation.5 The Court held it per se illegal for “a
manufacturer to agree with its distributor to set the minimum price the distributor
can charge for manufacturer’s goods.”6 Nearly 100 years later, the Court faced this
issue once again in Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.7 The Leegin
Court rejected the established precedent of Dr. Miles, and directed a return to the
rule of reason for governing vertical minimum price ﬁxing.8
Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. (Leegin) sold women’s clothing and
accessories.9 Leegin, under the Brighton brand, sold a wide variety of women’s
* Candidate for J.D., University of Wyoming, 2009. I thank my loving wife, Sonja for her
unwavering support, consistent encouragement and listening ear; and our children Benjamin,
Brayden and Madison for their patience and welcome diversions during this project. I thank
Dean Dee Pridgen for her priceless insights and guidance. In addition, special thanks to Mr. Mark
Roszkowski for sharing his valuable experience and perspectives.
1
E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, UNDERSTANDING ANTITRUST AND ITS ECONOMIC
IMPLICATIONS 3 (Matthew Bender & Co. 4th ed 2003).
2

Id.

3

Id.

4

Rudolph J.R. Peritz, “Nervine” and Knavery: The Life and Times of Dr. Miles Medical
Company, in ANTITRUST STORIES 61-62 (Eleanor M. Fox & Daniel A. Crane eds., Foundation Press
2007).
5

Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).

6

Leegin Creative Leather Prod., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2710 (2007).

7

Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2710.

8

Id.

9

Id.
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fashion accessories to over 5,000 retail stores throughout the United States.10
Leegin believed that by selling to small and independent boutiques, rather than
large retailers, customers received more service and a better shopping experience.11
Beginning in 1995, PSKS sold Brighton goods at Kay’s Kloset located in Lewisville,
Texas.12 To promote the Brighton brand, Kay’s Kloset invested thousands of dollars
in television, newspaper, and direct mail ads.13 As a result, Kay’s Kloset became
their market’s premier place to buy Brighton products.14
In 1997, Leegin instituted the Brighton Retail Pricing and Promotion Policy
forcing retailers to sell Brighton products at Brighton’s suggested prices at all
times.15 In accordance with this policy, Leegin refused to do business with retailers
who discounted Brighton products.16 After instituting this policy, Leegin pursued
Brighton Heart Store Agreements with all of their retailers.17 In these agreements,
Leegin offered retailers incentives to sell Brighton products at the suggested price
every day of the year.18 Leegin hoped this would prevent retailers from discounting
their brand, thus harming its image and reputation as a high-quality product.19
Leegin believed this would also induce retailers to use the extra funds, generated
by a higher price, to improve customer service.20
In late 2002, after discovering that Kay’s Kloset sold Brighton Products at
a discount, Leegin stopped supplying Brighton goods to Kay’s Kloset.21 This
resulted in damages to Kay’s Kloset, including nullifying the beneﬁt of all of
Kay’s Kloset’s advertising.22 PSKS ﬁled suit in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas, and argued Leegin violated the Sherman Act
by entering into vertical minimum price ﬁxing agreements.23 The district court
10

Id.

11

Id. at 2710-11.

12

Leegin Creative Leather Prod., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2711 (2007).

13

Brief of Respondent-Appellee at 4, Leegin Creative Leather Prod. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct.
2705 (2007) (No. 06-480), 2007 WL 621855.
14

Id.

15

Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2711.

16

Id.

17

Id.

18

Brief of Respondent-Appellee at 1, Leegin Creative Leather Prod. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct.
2705 (2007) (No. 06-480), 2007 WL 621855.
19

Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2711.

20

Id. In a letter establishing this policy, Leegin stated: “In this age of mega stores . . . consumers are perplexed by promises of product quality and support of product which we believe is
lacking in these large stores. . . . We, at Leegin, choose to break away from the pack by selling [at]
specialty stores.” Id.
21

Id.

22

Brief of Respondent-Appellee at 5, Leegin Creative Leather Prod. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct.
2705 (2007) (No. 06-480), 2007 WL 621855.
23

Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2712.
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held the economic justiﬁcations for vertical minimum pricing are irrelevant under
the Dr. Miles per se rule.24 Thus the court refused to consider any possible procompetitive justiﬁcations for this anti-competitive behavior.25 The jury found
PSKS had agreed to ﬁx Brighton Products’ retail price and injuring PSKS’s.26
Therefore, the jury awarded damages of $1.2 million.27 The district court trebled
damages and entered a judgment for $3,975,000.80.28
Leegin appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
arguing the court should adjudicate vertical minimum price restraints using the
rule of reason, and not the per se rule.29 The court did not accept this argument and
upheld the per se rule.30 The court based its ruling on the United States Supreme
Court’s application of the per se rule to vertical minimum price ﬁxing.31
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether courts
should continue applying the per se rule for vertical minimum price ﬁxing.32
Ultimately, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit and, in a ﬁvefour decision, overruled the precedent established in Dr. Miles.33 The Court held
vertical minimum price ﬁxing is no longer per se illegal, but courts must analyze
these types of agreements under a rule of reason test.34
This case note examines the signiﬁcance of this decision.35 First, this case
note introduces a few basic economic principles, which principles are essential
to understanding the decision in Leegin.36 Second, this case note addresses the
signiﬁcance and potential impact of Leegin by comparing it to an earlier decision,
which is strikingly similar.37 Based upon that analysis, this case note evaluates how

24

Id.

25

Id.

26

Id.; Brief of Respondent-Appellee at 1, Leegin Creative Leather Prod. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S.
Ct. 2705 (2007) (No. 06-480), 2007 WL 621855.
27

Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2712.

28

Id; The Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2000).

29

Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2712.

30

Id.

31

Id. The U.S. Supreme Court in its opinion validated the Fifth Circuit’s holding in this case.
Id. The Court determined the Fifth Circuit correctly upheld the per se rule based upon the law at
that time. Id.
32

Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2712.

33

Id. at 2710, 2712, 2725.

34

Id. at 2720.

35

See infra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.

36

See infra notes 39-60 and accompanying text.

37

See infra notes 168-179 and accompanying text.
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Leegin may affect lower courts and practitioners.38 Finally, this case note examines
why courts so often ignore or discount stare decisis in antitrust decisions.39

BACKGROUND
The Sherman Act is the ﬁrst and foremost antitrust doctrine in the U.S.40
This Act seeks to avoid, “business concentration, acquisition of monopoly power,
and cartels that might lead to increased prices and overcharges to consumers.”41
Section I of the Sherman Act states: “Every contract, combination in the form
of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among
the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.”42 From the
broad brushstrokes of the Sherman Act, courts endeavored to create workable
rules and guidelines for determining the legality of various agreements.43 This
section discusses how the Court historically analyzed vertical restraints under the
Sherman Act, how that analysis transformed over the last 100 years and Leegin’s
place in that metamorphosis.

Vertical Restraints of Trade
From the Sherman Act’s broad brushstrokes, the Court struggled to ﬁnd
the acceptable boundaries for vertical restraints of trade.44 These restraints begin
with a vertical commercial relationship that consists of the chain of supplier,
manufacturer, distributor, and retailer.45 Minimum price ﬁxing, in a vertical
relationship, “refers to an agreement between manufacturers and retailers under
which the retailers are obligated to sell that manufacturer’s products to consumers
only at or above the prices speciﬁed by the manufacturer.”46 These agreements are
38

See infra notes 180-86 and accompanying text.

39

See infra notes 187-214 and accompanying text.

40

See Stephen Labaton, Sherman’s Act’s 100 Years of Protecting Competition, N.Y. TIMES, July 6,
1990, at A12, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C0CE1DF163CF935
A35754C0A966958260.
41

See Sullivan & Harrison, supra note 1, at 3.

42

The Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).

43

See generally Leegin Creative Leather Prod., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2714 (2007)
(example of the court attempting to create workable guidelines for governing vertical restraints).
44

See infra notes 55-86 and accompanying text.

45

ANDREW I. GAVIL, WILLIAM E. KOVACIC & JOHNATHAN B. BAKER, ANTITRUST LAW
PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY 340 (2002).

IN

46
An Open Letter to the U.S. Supreme Court of the United States from Commissioner Pamela
Jones Harbour, 2 n.5, (Feb. 26, 2007) (citing Thomas K. McCraw, Competition and “Fair Trade”:
History and Theory, 16 RES. IN ECON. HISTORY, 185, 185 (1996)), available at www.ftc.gov/speeches/
harbour/070226verticalminimumpriceﬁxing.pdf. Ms. Harbour explained:

Those who favor vertical minimum price ﬁxing agreements often refer to them using
less pejorative terms, such as resale price maintenance, margin maintenance, or even
retailer incentives. Id. (“It is no accident that proponents of legalizing resale price
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also known as resale price maintenance.47 After Dr. Miles, the Court considered
these agreements per se illegal, regardless of the possible competitive beneﬁts.48
In addition to vertical minimum price restraints, there are other types of
vertical restraints such as vertical maximum price restraints, and non-price
restraints.49 Vertical maximum price restraints occur when a manufacturer sets a
maximum price at which the distributor or the retailer can sell its goods.50 Vertical
non-pricing agreement occurs when a manufacturer enters into an agreement
with a retailer based on something other than price.51 The U.S. Supreme
Court historically held vertical maximum price ﬁxing and vertical non-pricing
agreements were per se illegal.52 However, it relaxed this standard in favor of the
rule of reason, requiring courts distinguish between unreasonable and reasonable
restraints.53 Courts balance factors, such as the agreement’s competitive effects, on
a case by case basis.54

maintenance have used ‘fair trade’ as a synonym, while opponents have preferred
terms such as ‘vertical price ﬁxing’”).
Id.; see also Gavil, Kovacic & Baker, supra note 45, at 341-343 (providing additional clariﬁcation
on what vertical minimum price ﬁxing requires of manufacturers and distributors).
47
Leegin Creative Leather Prod., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705 passim (2007).
48
Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2712-13. The Supreme Court introduced per se illegality and its counterpart the rule of reason in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). Legally a per se rule
establishes that once two parties reach an agreement, “the anticompetitive effect is presumed.” Gavil,
Kovacic & Baker, supra note 45, at 96-98. Economically, the per se rule exhibits a decision that the
cost of identifying a few exceptions to the rule “outweigh[s] the cost of occasionally condemning
conduct that might upon further inspection prove to be acceptable . . . .” Id. at 96.
49
Gavil, Kovacic & Baker, supra note 45 at 343.
50
Id.
51
Id. These restrictions are typically territorial restrictions or customer allocations amongst
manufacturers or distributors. Id.
52
U.S. v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 373-74 (1967) (holding vertical non-price
restraints are subject to a per se rule); Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 151-52 (1968) (holding
vertical maximum price restraints are subject to a per se rule).
53
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58-59 (1977) (holding vertical
non-price restraints are no longer subject to a per se rule, and the rule of reason now applies); State
Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 7, 22 (1997) (ﬁnding vertical maximum price ﬁxing is no longer a per
se violation but should be judged based upon the rule of reason); Sullivan & Harrison, supra note
1, at 127-28.
54
The best case to explain the rule of reason is Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 221 U.S.
1 (1911). Justice Brandeis explained the broad rule of reason test as follows:
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates
and perhaps promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even
destroy competition. To determine that question the court must ordinarily consider
the facts peculiar to the business . . . ;its conditions before and after the restraint was
imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of
the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy,
the purpose or end sought to be attained are all relevant facts.
Id. at 238.
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Vertical Minimum Price Restraints Initially Ruled Per Se Illegal
Before Leegin and the rule of reason, the Supreme Court, in Dr. Miles Medical
Company, held a distributor or manufacturer could not ﬁx the minimum resale
price.55 The Dr. Miles Medical Company sold different types of medicines
throughout the United States, utilized various wholesale dealers, and attempted
to ﬁx the price wholesalers and retailers could charge for Dr. Miles’s products.56
Dr. Miles Medical Company maintained those prices by using serial numbers
to track product’s pricing.57 The Court found this behavior restrained trade as
the Dr. Miles Medical Company attempted to control the entire trade of their
product.58 The Court in Dr. Miles emphasized these types of restraints are related
to the restraints on alienation.59The Court stated:
The right of alienation is one of the essential incidents of a right
of general property in movables, and restraints upon alienation
have been generally regarded as obnoxious to public policy,
which is best subserved by great freedom of trafﬁc in such things
as pass from hand to hand.60
In establishing vertical minimum price ﬁxing as per se illegal, the Court in
Dr. Miles noted there is very little public policy support for vertical minimum
price ﬁxing.61

Court Overturns Per Se Illegality In Favor of the Rule of Reason for Vertical
Non-price Restraints
After Dr. Miles, the Court determined what rules should govern other forms
of vertical agreements, such as vertical non-price restraints.62 In 1967, the Supreme
Court ruled non-price restraints were also per se illegal in United States v. Arnold,
Schwinn & Co.63 Nevertheless, ten years later, in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania, the Court overruled that decision and determined non-price restraints
were subject to the rule of reason analysis.64

55

Id.; Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 384-85 (1911).

56

Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 374-75.

57

Id. at 395-96.

58

Id. at 400.

59

Id. at 404.

60

Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 404 (1911) (quoting John
D. Park & Sons Co. v. Hartman, 153 F. 24, 39 (6th Cir.)).
61

Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 408.

62

Id.

63

U.S. v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 372-73 (1967).

64

Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977).
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Like Leegin, GTE Sylvania overruled established precedent in Schwinn and
decided the rule of reason governed non-price vertical restraints.65 The GTE
Sylvania decision created tension and controversy in antitrust law by drawing
a distinction between vertical non-price restraints and vertical minimum price
restraints.66 It left Dr. Miles’s per se rule against vertical minimum price restraints
unchanged.67 However, GTE Sylvania determined courts should adjudicate
vertical non-price restraints under the rule of reason rather than a per se rule.68
Because of these similarities, many commentators and scholars struggled to justify
different rules for non-price and minimum price restraints.69
Justice White’s concurring opinion in GTE Sylvania recognized this strain
and predicted this decision could pressure the Court to overrule Dr. Miles.70
Justice White recognized “the per se illegality of price restrictions . . . involves
signiﬁcantly different questions of analysis and policy” and the Court would
struggle to justify the distinction between vertical price and non-price restraints.71
Ultimately Justice White correctly predicted “[t]he effect, if not the intention, of
the Court’s opinion is necessarily to call into the question the ﬁrmly established
per se rule” of Dr. Miles.72

Court Overturns Per Se Illegality in Favor of Rule of Reason for Vertical
Maximum Price Restraints
The Court in Albrecht v. Herald Co. extended the per se rule of Dr. Miles to
apply to vertical maximum price ﬁxing.73 As with GTE Sylvania, the Court later,
in State Oil Co. v. Khan, overruled the per se rule of Albrecht in favor of the rule
of reason.74 The Court justiﬁed its decision for many of the same reasons as GTE
Sylvania and Leegin.75 These justiﬁcations included the possible pro-competitive
effects of maximum price restrictions, increased economic knowledge and
subsequent decisions weakening Albrecht’s precedential underpinnings.76

65

Id. at 58.

66

Id. at 56.

67

Id. at 57-58.

68

Id.

69

Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 48 nn.13-14 (1977).

70

Id. at 69-70 (White, J., concurring).

71

Id. (White, J., concurring)

72

Id. at 70.

73

Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 148 153-54 (1968).

74

State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 7 (1997).

75

Id. at 13.

76

Id. at 13-15.
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Congress Addresses Vertical Restraints
Congress engaged in determining the legality of vertical minimum price
ﬁxing.77 In 1937, Congress passed the Miller-Tydings Fair Trade Act and the
McGuire Act, which allowed individual states to adopt laws that permitted
vertical minimum price ﬁxing.78 However, in 1975, Congress repealed both acts.79
When Congress repealed the Acts, thirty-six states had legalized vertical minimum
price ﬁxing.80

Trend From Per Se Illegality to Rule of Reason
Since the Sherman Act, the Court moved from the per se rule to the rule
of reason in analyzing vertical restraints.81 Initially, the Court determined the
per se illegality governed cases like Dr. Miles, Schwinn and Albrecht.82 Slowly, as
discussed above, the Court whittled away per se illegality until it is inapplicable to
nearly any vertical agreements.83 Congress contributed by attempting to legislate
the most effective way to deal with vertical agreements.84 With this backdrop and
with weakened precedential underpinnings, the Leegin Court took the stage to
determine whether the per se rule still applied to vertical minimum price ﬁxing.85
Many recognize this decision as being a potential watershed case in antitrust law
with broad and wide-reaching effects.86

PRINCIPAL CASE
In Leegin Creative Leather Products Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., the Court considered
overturning nearly 100 years of precedent established by Dr. Miles.87 In Dr.
Miles, the Court decided vertical minimum pricing ﬁxing was per se illegal under

77
See infra notes 78-80 and accompanying text (stating the laws Congress adopted to address
vertical restraints).
78

Leegin Creative Leather Prod., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2727-28 (2007).

79

Id.

80

Id.

81

See supra notes 40-72 and accompanying text (stating the trend away from the per se rule in
antitrust litigation).
82

Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2714.

83

See supra notes 59-65 and accompanying text (explaining the disintegration of the per se rule
in antitrust litigation).
84

See supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.

85

Leegin Creative Leather Prod., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2710 (2007).

86

Id. at 2714; An Open Letter to the U.S. Supreme Court of the United States from
Commissioner Pamela Jones Harbour, 2 n.5, (Feb. 26, 2007) available at www.ftc.gov/speeches/
harbour/070226verticalminimumpriceﬁxing.pdf.
87

Leegin Creative Leather Prod., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2714 (2007).
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the Sherman Act, Section One.88 In a ﬁve-four split decision, the Leegin Court
overruled Dr. Miles and decided to judge vertical minimum price ﬁxing by the
rule of reason.89

Rule of Reason and Per Se Tests
Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas,
and Alito, wrote the majority opinion.90 The Court began by discussing the rule
of reason’s purpose.91 According to the Court, the rule of reason appropriately
governed whether behavior restrains trade and violates section one of the Sherman
Act.92 When applying the rule of reason, the Court instructed, a court “weighs all
of the circumstances of a case in deciding whether a restrictive practice should be
prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on competition.”93 The rule of
reason analysis, according to the Leegin Court, balances the pro-competitive or
anti-competitive effects of the behavior.94

Pro-competitive Justiﬁcations for Vertical Minimum Price Fixing
While acknowledging the divergence of economic consensus, the Court
found numerous situations where vertical minimum price ﬁxing may have procompetitive effects.95 The Court justiﬁed vertical minimum price ﬁxing based
upon inter- and intra-brand competition.96 Inter-brand competition occurs
between competing brands such as Burger King’s “Whopper” and McDonald’s
“Big Mac.”97 Intra-brand competition is between “sellers of the same brand
—such as rival . . . Burger King franchises.”98 The Court determined vertical
minimum restraints eliminate competition between sellers of the same brand or
inter-brand competitors.99 Thus, the Court supposed eliminating this type of
competition encouraged retailers to provide additional customer service to assist
the manufacturer competition against rival manufacturers.100

88

Id. at 2713.

89

Id. at 2710.

90

Id. at 2710.

91

Id. at 2712-13.

92

Leegin Creative Leather Prod., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2712 (2007).

93

Id. (quoting Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977)).

94

Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2713.

95

Id. at 2714-15.

96

Id. at 2715.

97

Gavil, Kovacic & Baker, supra note 44, at 340.

98

Gavil, Kovacic & Baker, supra note 44, at 341.

99

Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2715.

100

Id. at 2715.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2008

9

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 8 [2008], No. 2, Art. 13

692

WYOMING LAW REVIEW

Vol. 8

The Court also discussed another possible beneﬁt vertical minimum price
ﬁxing, the elimination of “free riding.”101 Free riding occurs when a retailer
receives the beneﬁt of another’s investment.102 An example of free riding is when
a consumer learns about a product from a retailer who invested in high-quality
showrooms and superior customer service and then the customer purchases the
product from a different discount retailer.103 According to the Court, vertical
agreements would help to eliminate this problem by preventing a discount retailer
from undercutting the high quality service provider.104

Economic Effects of Vertical Minimum Price Fixing
The Court proceeded to analyze whether the per se rule should apply given
its various economic effects.105 As discussed above, vertical minimum price
ﬁxing has both pro-competitive and anti-competitive effects depending on the
circumstances.106 Therefore, the Court held the per se rule is not appropriate
for cases of vertical minimum price ﬁxing.107 The Court asserted the per se
rule should only apply where price ﬁxing would always or almost always tend
to restrict competition and decrease output.108 This is clearly not the case with
vertical minimum price ﬁxing, the court declared in its opinion.109
Although the Court found the per se rule inappropriate for vertical price
ﬁxing, it also recognized its potential for economic danger.110 As a result, the
Supreme Court cautioned the lower courts to exercise diligence in applying the
rule of reason to these restraints.111 Factors to consider include the size of the
market, whether competing manufacturers adopt the restraint, the source of the
restraint, and the relative market power of the restraining ﬁrm.112
According to the Court, as lower courts apply the rule of reason they will build
a litigation structure that allows the pro-competitive effects of vertical minimum
price restraints while eliminating the possible anticompetitive side effects.113
101

Id.

102

Id.

103

Id. at 2715-16.

104

Leegin Creative Leather Prod., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2716 (2007).

105

Id. at 2717.

106

Id. at 2717-18.

107

Id.

108

Id. at 2713.

109

Leegin Creative Leather Prod., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2717 (2007).

110

Id.

111

Id. at 2719.

112

Id. at 2719-20.

113

Id. at 2720.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol8/iss2/13

10

Jardine: Economic Law - Vertical Minimum Pricing in Leegin - Adrift with t

2008

CASE NOTE

693

Stare Decisis and Overturning Dr. Miles
The Court acknowledged stare decisis could justify upholding Dr. Miles.114
The Court recognized, “stare decisis reﬂects a policy judgment that in most
matters, it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than
that it be settled right.”115 However, the Court suggested stare decisis is applied
differently to common-law statutes, such as the Sherman Act.116 Therefore, the
Sherman Act’s application should change in response to a changing economic
landscape.117 Consequently, the Court examined the current economic views of
vertical minimum price restraints, and asserted that many economic scholars
believe vertical minimum price ﬁxing has widespread beneﬁts.118 In addition,
the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission both advised the
Court to abandon the per se rule in favor of the rule of reason.119 These agency’s
signiﬁcant antitrust expertise persuaded the Court to accept their advice.120
Ultimately, the Court concluded the economic landscape justiﬁed using the rule
of reason in evaluating vertical minimum price ﬁxing.121

Justice Breyer’s Dissent
Justice Breyer wrote the opinion for the dissent.122 The dissent recognized Dr.
Miles made it illegal, under Section One of the Sherman Act, for a manufacturer
and the dealer to ﬁx prices.123 The dissent found the Court had “consistently
read Dr. Miles as establishing a bright-line rule that agreements ﬁxing minimum
resale prices are per se illegal.”124 In fact, the dissent pointed out, stare decisis not
only compels support for the per se rule, but Congress has also continually and
consistently refused to overturn that per se rule.125 The dissent asserted the Court
mistakenly overturned Dr. Miles and the per se rule.126

114

Leegin Creative Leather Prod., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2720 (2007).

115

Id. at 2720 (quoting State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997)).

116

Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2720.

117

Id.

118

Id. at 2721.

119

Id. at 2721.

120

Id.

121

Leegin Creative Leather Prod., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2725 (2007).

122

Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).

123

Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).

124

Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).

125

Id. at 2725-26. (Breyer, J., dissenting).

126

Leegin Creative Leather Prod., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2725-26 (2007) (Breyer,
J., dissenting).
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The Beneﬁt of the Per Se Rule over the Rule of Reason
The dissent began its discussion with an analysis of the per se and rule of
reason tests.127 The dissent acknowledged courts often applies the “rule of
reason” in these situations by balancing the possible anticompetitive effects with
other justiﬁcations.128 However, when the probable anticompetitive risks are so
severe and the justiﬁcations so hard to prove, the Court imposed per se unlawfulness, which “instructs courts to ﬁnd the practice unlawful all (or nearly all)
the time.”129
The dissent examined the methods by which courts analyze questions of
vertical minimum price ﬁxing.130 The dissent discussed three typical arguments for
and against using the per se rule.131 Those arguments involve three considerations:
1) possible anticompetitive effects and higher consumer prices, 2) potential
beneﬁts, and 3) administration.132

Vertical Price Agreements Means Higher Consumer Prices
The dissent looked at historical data regarding the repeal of the Miller-Tydings
Fair Trade Act and the McGuire Act to support the argument against vertical
minimum price ﬁxing.133 These acts gave states the power to authorize vertical
minimum price ﬁxing.134 In states that allowed vertical minimum price ﬁxing,
the price rose by nineteen to twenty-seven percent.135 Following the 1975 repeal
of these acts, the Federal Trade Commission and economists generally agreed,
“resale price maintenance tends to produce higher consumer prices than would
otherwise be the case.”136

Stare Decisis and Retaining Dr. Miles
The dissent stated the precedent for the per se rule began with Dr. Miles and
continued for a century, resulting in great reliance from attorneys, their clients,
and business executives.137 The dissent noted Dr. Miles has “been cited dozens of
127

Id. at 2726 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

128

Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).

129

Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).

130

Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).

131

Leegin Creative Leather Prod., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2726 (2007) (Breyer,
J., dissenting).
132

Id. at 2726-27 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

133

Id. at 2727.

134

Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). When Congress repealed these acts in 1975 thirty-four states
allowed minimum resale price maintenance. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
135

Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2728 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

136

Leegin Creative Leather Prod., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2728 (2007) (Breyer,
J., dissenting).
137

Id. at 2731 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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times in this Court and hundreds of times in lower courts.”138 In fact, the dissent
pointed out it was unaware of another case where the Supreme Court overturned
such a well-established precedent.139
The dissent argued that while a change in economic or legal circumstances
could justify the Court’s position, no such change occurred.140 In fact, according
to the dissent, the most relevant change supports the maintenance of the per se
rule.141 This change occurred in 1975 when Congress repealed the McGuire and
Miler-Tyding Acts.142 The dissent argued that by repealing those Acts, Congress
intended a return to the Dr. Miles’ per se rule, making vertical minimum price
ﬁxing per se illegal.143
The dissent concluded the only certainty from this decision is that the price
of goods will rise at retail and “it will create considerable legal turbulence as lower
courts seek to develop workable principles.”144

ANALYSIS
Introduction
Unfortunately a law student, judge or, a practitioner trying to master antitrust
litigation is “in an Alice and Wonderland world where words do not always mean
what they say. Nowhere is this more true [sic] than with respect to what is known
as the rule of reason.”145 This analysis section explores that Wonderland.146 First,
this case note will argue the rule of reason in Leegin will become a standard of “de
facto” per se legality, as it has with other vertical restraints.147 Second, stare decisis
in antitrust litigation is not a potent argument for keeping legal precedent.148

138

Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).

139

Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).

140

Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).

141

Leegin Creative Leather Prod., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2731 (2007) (Breyer,
J., dissenting).
142

Id. (Breyer J., dissenting).

143

Id. at 2732 (Breyer J., dissenting).

144

Id. at 2737 (Breyer J., dissenting).

145

Stephen Calkins, California Dental Association: Not a Quick Look But Not the Full Monty,
67 ANTITRUST L. J. 495, 520 (2000).
146

See infra notes 149-188 and accompanying text.

147

See infra notes 151-88 and accompanying text.

148

See infra notes 189-216 and accompanying text.
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The Leegin Court Announced a Return to the Rule of Reason
The Leegin Court determined “vertical price restraints are to be judged by the
rule of reason.”149 In explaining the rule of reason standard, the Court cites to cases
such as GTE Sylvania and Chicago Board of Trade.150 These cases express a formal
rule of reason.151 In applying the rule of reason, the Court explained the fact ﬁnder
should examine whether the vertical restraint is unreasonable on a case-by-case
basis.152 If a court determines the restraint is unreasonable, then it is illegal.153 The
Leegin Court energetically advises the lower courts in their application of the rule
of reason, and encourages lower courts to develop “litigation structure” so the rule
of reason can “eliminate anticompetitive restraints from the market and []provide
guidance to businesses.”154 In addition, the Court predicts lower courts will strive
for a rule of reason that is a “fair and efﬁcient way to prohibit anticompetitive
restraints and to promote pro-competitive ones.”155 Although the Leegin Court set
forth the full rule of reason as a fair way to govern vertical minimum restraints,
when applied the restraint is almost always reasonable, so the defendant almost
always win.156
Lower courts will struggle to adhere to the Leegin Court’s explanation of the
rule of reason.157 While the explanation of the rule of reason in Leegin, GTE
Sylvania and Chicago Board of Trade appears to be “an elegant assignment of
responsibilities,” litigators, practitioners, and judges have difﬁculty applying the
full rule of reason standard.158 Examples of these difﬁculties include complex
balancing of factors such as the market effects of the restraint, identifying pro and
anticompetitive effects and predicting the consequences after the imposition of
the restraint159 Therefore, instead of applying the rule of reason, the lower courts
developed different approaches or ﬁlters.160 The use of these ﬁlters to adjudicate
149

Leegin Creative Leather Prod., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2710 (2007).

150

See, e.g., id. at 2712-13.

151

See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977).

152

Id.; See, e.g., Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2726 (Breyer J., dissenting); Nat’l Collegiate Athletic
Assn. v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 109-110 & n.39 (1984); Nat’l Soc. of Prof ’l
Eng’r v. U.S., 435 U.S. 679, 688-92 (1978); Board of Trade of Chicago v. U. S., 246 U.S. 231, 238
(1918).
153

See Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2712.

154

Leegin Creative Leather Prod., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2720 (2007).

155

Id.

156

Calkins, supra note 145, at 521.

157

See infra notes 159-162 and accompanying text.

158

Calkins, supra note 145, at 521 (stating legal practitioners have problems identifying market
effects of the restraint).
159

Calkins, supra note 145, at 521.

160

Douglas H. Ginsburg, Vertical Restraints: De Facto Legality Under the Rule of Reason, 60
ANTITRUST L. J. 67, 73-75 (1991).
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these cases ultimately resulted in a de facto per se legality for vertical non-price
agreements.161
One of the primary ﬁlters through which the lower courts apply the rule of
reason is that of market power.162 However, proving market power in an antitrust
case challenges any plaintiff.163 In addition, a plaintiff in market power litigation
“faces the prospect of long, expensive discovery, extensive motions practice and
then merger-like battle over market power.”164 The battle rages as defendants hire
expert economists, who testify about factors such as lack of market power, ease
of entry, powerful buyers, and market situations.165 If the plaintiff fails to prove
the defendant has market power, then many of the lower courts will ﬁnd for
the defendant without engaging in a full rule of reason analysis set out by the
Court.166 The use of ﬁlters such as market power have formed the basis for what
has been identiﬁed as the “truncated,” “quick look,” “abbreviated, “structured,” or
“ﬂexible” rule of reason.167

GTE Sylvania—Rule of Reason
GTE Sylvania is an example of lower courts applying ﬁlters when instructed
by the U.S. Supreme Court to apply the full rule of reason.168 Because the
Court’s analyzed and decided GTE Sylvania and Leegin in a similar manner,
GTE Sylvania is useful to predict the impact of the Leegin decision on lower
courts, practitioners, and business people.169 The GTE Sylvania Court reversed
precedent by overturning the per se rule and determined that vertical non-price
restraints should be adjudicated under the rule of reason.170 In the formal rule
of reason, the GTE Sylvania Court advised lower courts in applying the formal
rule of reason by balancing the circumstances of a case to determine “whether a

161

See Ginsburg, supra note 160, at 67.

162

Ginsburg, supra note 160, at 74. “One approach is to use a market power screen: no power,
no foul.” Id.
163

Calkins, supra note 145, at 521-22.

164

Calkins, supra note 145, at 521.

165

Calkins, supra note 145, at 521.

166

Calkins, supra note 145, at 521.

167

Calkins, supra note 145, at 522; see, e.g., Veronica G. Kayne, Vertical Restraints: Resale Price
Maintenance, Territorial and Customer Restraints, 1648 PLI/CORP 45, 52 (2008); Philip F. Zeidman,
Franchising and Other Methods of Distribution: Regulatory Pattern and Judicial Trends, 1648 PLI/
CORP 473, 646 (2008); Gosta Schindler, Wagging the Dog? Reconsidering Antitrust-Based Regulation
of IP-Licensing, 12 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 49, 72 (2008); Marc Edelman & C. Keith Harrison,
Analyzing the WNBA’S Mandatory Age/Education Policy from a Legal Cultural, and Ethical Perspective:
Women, Men, and the Professional Sports Landscape, 3 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 1, 40 (2008).
168

See infra notes 168-79 and accompanying text.

169

See supra notes 170-79 and accompanying text.

170

Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57 (1977).
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restrictive practice should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint
on competition.”171 The Court cites with approval to Justice Brandies and his
comprehensive explanation of the rule of reason in Chicago Board of Trade.172 The
GTE Sylvania Court evidently intended that lower courts should “return to the
rule of reason that governed vertical restrictions prior to Schwinn.”173 In order to
comply with the Court’s decision in GTE Sylvania, lower courts needed to engage
in a complex balancing test to determine the reasonableness of each restraint.174
However, the majority of lower courts have not engaged in the complex
balancing test envisioned in GTE Sylvania.175 From a statistical survey done in
1991 and summaries of cases decided under GTE Sylvania, “it is apparent that the
courts of appeals are generally not engaging in the balancing . . . that the Supreme
Court envisioned.176 This commentator in 1991 examined the forty-ﬁve cases
decided under GTE Sylvania which applied the rule of reason on its merits.177
In forty-one, or more than ninety percent of those cases, the Court decisions
favored the defendant.178 In other words, the Court determined the restraint was
reasonable in these cases.179

Leegin “De Facto” Per Se Legal Test
The Leegin Court’s description of the “rule of reason” is similar to the
description of the formal rule of reason in GTE Sylvania.180 Despite the strong
language of the Leegin Court, the lower courts will not apply the full rule of
171
GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. at 49. The Court also cites to Justice Brandeis’s explanation of
the rule of reason in Chicago Board of Trade:

The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposes is such as merely regulates
and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress
or even destroy competition. To determine that question the court must ordinarily
consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its
condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint
and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to
exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to
be attained, are all relevant facts. This is not because a good intention will save an
otherwise objectionable regulation or the reverse; but because knowledge of intent
may help the court to interpret facts and to predict consequences.
Id. at 49 n.15 (quoting Chicago Board of Trade v. U.S., 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918)).
172

GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. at 49.

173

Id. at 59.

174

Id.

175

Ginsburg, supra note 160, at 76.

176

Ginsburg, supra note 160, at 76.

177

Ginsburg, supra note 160, at 70-71.

178

Ginsburg, supra note 160, at 71.

179

See Ginsburg, supra note 160, at 71.

180

See Michael L. Denger & Joshus Lipton, The Rule of Reason and “Leegin Policies”: The
Supreme Court’s Guidance, 22-FALL ANTITRUST 45, 45 (2007).
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reason.181 Instead the lower courts will judge vertical minimum resale price
maintenance, as they do other vertical restraints, under a rule of “de facto” per
se legality based upon ﬁlters such as market power.182 GTE Sylvania and Kahn
are two cases that exemplify the Court stating a rule of reason that in actuality
becomes “de facto” per se legality.183
Because of the similarities between Leegin, GTE Sylvania and Kahn, law
students, judges and practitioners can expect the signiﬁcant majority of vertical
minimum restraints will be “de facto” per se legal.184 The formal rule of reason is
now nothing but legal ﬁction in most situations.185 The rule of reason has become
a “toothless legal standard” most likely to be applied through a ﬁlter, such as
market power, and in favor of the defendant.186

Stare Decisis —Weak Antitrust Argument
The Sherman Act, on its face, is a deceptively simple statute.187 It makes illegal
“[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce.”188 Antitrust litigation heaped complex layers of
“judicial gloss” on this single sentence.189 Lawyers and judges are not completely
responsible for the increased complexity.190 Economics, as a science, has also

181

See generally supra notes 158-169 and accompanying text (discussing the possible reasons
lower courts will not apply the full rule of reason).
182

See Ginsburg, supra note 160, at 76.

183

State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 22 (1997); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.,
433 U.S. 36, 49-50 (1977); see generally supra notes 144-183 and accompanying text (analyzing
how these cases are likely to be “de facto” per se legal).
184
Mark E. Roszkowski, The Sad Legacy of GTE Sylvania and Its “Rule of Reason”: The Dealer
Termination Cases and the Demise of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 22 CONN. L. REV. 129, 134
(1989).

[It] clearly indicate[s] the bankruptcy of GTE Sylvania and its rule of reason
standard. . . . GTE Sylvania has further created a business climate: in which virtually
any restraint of trade that arguably can be characterized as “vertical,” except the
barest and most blatant forms of resale price maintenance, is per se legal.
Id.
185

Id.

186

Id.

187

See Andrew S. Oldham, Sherman’s March (In)To the Sea, 74 TENN. L. REV. 319, 320

(2007).
188

15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).

189

See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977); Oldham, supra
note 187, at 320.
190

See Andrew I. Gavil, Antitrust Bookends: The 2006 Supreme Court Term in Historical Context,
22 FALL-ANTITR 21, 21-23 (2007); John McGaraghan, A Modern Analytical Framework for
Monopolization in Innovative Markets for Products With Network Effects, 30 HASTINGS COMM. &
ENT. L.J. 179, 184.
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changed and evolved since the beginning of antitrust litigation in the United States
as “over-time, empirical evidence and cutting edge research discredit old theories
and supplant them with new ones.”191 Therefore, the courts are faced with divergent
economic views that often contradict established precedent.192 While the Sherman
Act and economic decisions like Dr. Miles have existed unchanged for nearly a
hundred years, since then, the knowledge and understanding of economics and
antitrust has increased dramatically.193 This increased understanding jeopardizes
the safety and strength of these early precedents by putting them in conﬂict with
modern reality.194 This evolution in economics created tension in the Court
seeking to maintain modern antitrust policy based upon current knowledge and
prior rulings weighted with stare decisis.195

Changing Economic Circumstances Justiﬁes Ignoring Stare Decisis
The Court in Khan recognized “the very nature of antitrust law creates a
tension which puts it in conﬂict with the principle of stare decisis.”196 In this
decision, the Court explained that in antitrust cases courts must balance the weight
of precedent against “changed circumstances and the lessons of accumulated
experience.”197
The Leegin case exempliﬁes a Court dealing with that tension.198 The Dr.
Miles Court relied upon antiquated doctrines such as restraints on alienation.199
However, since that time the Court and economic commentators determined
that reliance upon this “ancient rule” is unfounded when applied to antitrust
analysis.200 In Leegin, the Court warned dispositive weight should not be placed

191

Bruce Abramson, Intellectual Property and the Alleged Collapsing of Aftermarkets, 38 RUTGERS
L.J. 399, 423 (2007).
192

Abramson, supra note 191, at 423.

193

Brief for Economists as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Leegin Creative Leather Prod.,
Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007), 2007 WL 173681.
194

See Michael Sinclair, Precedent, Super-Precedent, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 363, 366-370

(2007).
195

See id.

196

Alan H. Silberman, Vertical Price, Customer and Territorial Limitations, 1602 PLI/CORP
421, 429 (2007); State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997).
197

Khan, 522 U.S. at 20.

198

Leegin Creative Leather Prod., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2714 (2007).

199

Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 404-05(1911); See Harvard
Law Review Association, Minimum Resale Price Maintenance, 121 HARV. L. REV. 425, 428 (2007);
See Donald F. Turner, The Deﬁnition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and
Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655, 687 (1962).
200

See Khan, 522 U.S. at 13 (citing R. Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An
Analysis of the Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75
COLUM. L. REV. 282, 295-96 (1975)).
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upon antiquated doctrines.201 Citing GTE Sylvania, the Court reasserted “the
state of the common law 400 or even 100 years ago is irrelevant to the issue before
us: the effect of the antitrust laws upon vertical distributional restraints in the
American economy today.”202 In Leegin, the Court relied upon current economic
understanding to trump well-established and overwhelming precedent.203

There are Signiﬁcant Beneﬁts in Allowing Flexibility in Antitrust Litigation
There are signiﬁcant beneﬁts for ﬂexibility in stare decisis for antitrust
litigation.204 While stare decisis is not a strict command, “in most matters it is
more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled
right.”205 However, there are also beneﬁts of setting stare decisis principles to the
side in antitrust litigation.206 By setting stare decisis aside the Court will modernize
and put to rest aged antitrust law and adapt to new economic understanding
which beneﬁts consumers.207 The Court can also adjust as knowledge of market
conditions increase “and as alternative scenarios arise within different market
conditions, courts [can] adapt antitrust law to account for and adjust to the
different applications.”208
It is therefore instructive to practitioners and businesses to realize that building
upon stare decisis in antitrust litigation is building upon an unstable foundation.209
It is much more reliable to stay abreast of modern economic scholarship.210 It is
increasingly likely the Court relies more upon modern economic thinking than
principles of stare decisis.211 While in many instances the law is better settled than
right, in antitrust litigation it may be more important that something be settled
right than settled at all.212

201

See Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2714.

202

Id. (quoting Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 53, n.21 (1977)).

203

Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2714.

204

See infra notes 207–13 and accompanying text.

205

Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

206

See infra notes 207-13 and accompanying text.

207

See Kathryn M. Fenton, From the Section Chair, 22 ANTITRUST 3 (2007); see also Barak D.
Richman & Christopher R. Murray, Rebuilding Illinois Brick: A Functionalist Approach to the Indirect
Purchaser Rule, 81 SCARL 69, 81 (2007).
208

Richman & Murray, supra note 207, at 81.

209

See supra notes 196-208 and accompanying text.

210

See supra notes 196-208 and accompanying text.

211

See supra notes 204-08 and accompanying text.

212

See supra notes 196-212 and accompanying text; but see Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co.,
285 U.S. 393, 405-06 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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The Supreme Court likely anticipated the impending legal turbulence and
recognized lower courts will have to “work out” the law in this area.213 Leegin,
while typifying a trend in antitrust law away from per se rules and toward the rule
of reason, it is also another signiﬁcant example of the instability of stare decisis in
antitrust law.214

CONCLUSION
The rule of reason continues to be an area where courts struggle in a sea of
complex and demanding legal standards.215 Stare decisis is ill-equipped to anchor
the antitrust litigation for the beneﬁt of students, practitioners and judges.216
The U.S. Supreme Court attempts to provide stability and ﬂexibility through
the comprehensive full blown rule of reason set forth in Chicago Board of Trade,
but that test is difﬁcult, if not impossible, to apply effectively.217 Therefore, lower
courts seized upon the spirit of the rule of reason by using different ﬁlters, such
as market power.218 However, until the U.S. Supreme Court provides additional
stability and greater direction for the application of the rule of reason, the lower
courts will drift in their application of this rule and continue to rule in favor of
defendants without market power.219
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Burnet, 285 U.S. at 405-06.

214

See supra notes 34-78, 180-95 and accompanying text.

215

See supra notes 55-86 and accompanying text.

216

See supra notes 187-214 and accompanying text.

217

See supra notes 149-61 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 156-61 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 160-61, 174-86 and accompanying text.
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